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ABSTRACT
In modern computer systems, usernames and passwords have been by far the most
common forms of authentication. A security system relying only on password protection
is defenseless when the passwords of legitimate users are compromised. A masquerader
can impersonate a legitimate user by using a compromised password.
An intrusion detection system (IDS) can provide an additional level of protection
for a security system by inspecting user behavior. In terms of detection techniques, there
are two types of IDSs: signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection. An
anomaly-based intrusion detection technique consists of two steps: 1) creating a normal
behavior model for legitimate users during the training process, 2) analyzing user
behavior against the model during the detection process.
In this project, we concentrate on masquerade detection, a specific type of
anomaly-based IDS. We have first explored suitable techniques to build a normal
behavior model for masquerade detection. After studying two existing modeling
techniques, N-gram frequency and hidden Markov models (HMMs), we have developed
a novel approach based on profile hidden Markov models (PHMMs). Then we have
analyzed these three approaches using the classical Schonlau data set. To find the best
detection results, we have also conducted sensitivity analysis on the modeling parameters.
However, we have found that our proposed PHMMs do not outperform the corresponding
HMMs. We conjectured that Schonlau data set lacked the position information required
by the PHMMs. To verify this conjecture, we have also generated several data sets with
position information. Our experimental results show that when there is no sufficient
training data, the PHMMs yield considerably better detection results than the
iv

corresponding HMMs since the generated position information is significantly helpful for
the PHMMs.
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NOMENCLATURE

IDS: Intrusion detection system.
Alert/Alarm: A signal suggesting that a system has been or is being attacked [1].
True Positive: A legitimate attack which triggers IDS to produce an alarm [1].
False Positive: An event signaling IDS to produce an alarm when no attack has
been taken place [1].
True Negative: When no attack has taken place and no alarm is raised [1].
False Negative: A failure of IDS to detect an actual attack [1].
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1. Introduction

1.1. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
In modern computer systems, usernames and passwords have been by far the most
common forms of authentication. A security system relying only on password protection
is defenseless when the passwords of legitimate users are compromised. A masquerader
can impersonate a legitimate user by using a compromised password.
To detect this issue of masquerading user, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
have been proposed to provide an additional protection for the system by inspecting user
behavior [2]. The basic approach used by an IDS is to monitor ongoing activities within
the system and to look for malicious or unusual behaviors. Once the IDS concludes a
harmful activity has occurred, further actions can be taken to intervene, such as raising an
alarm or blocking the user’s session. From the perspective of detection techniques, there
are two general detection techniques used by IDSs: signature-based detection (also
known as misuse detection) and anomaly-based detection.

1.1.1. Signature-based Detection and Anomaly-based Detection

Signature-based detection systems depend on predetermined patterns that
represent misuse. Such a pattern should summarize the distinctive characteristics of an
attack, often referred to as the signature of an attack. In the detection phase, the IDS
records and inspects user activities, and then looks for events that match a predefined

pattern. If a match is found, the detection system raises an intrusion alarm. As a result, a
signature-based system is very accurate for detecting known attacks. Moreover, with the
information associated with the signature, the IDS is able to give a concrete description
of the threat when raising an alarm [2]. However, a signature-based detection system
cannot detect unknown attacks. Without the signatures of new attacks, the IDS knows
nothing about such an attack. There is always a lag between the time when a new attack
is found in the wild and the integration of its signature into the IDS database. Therefore,
it is crucial for the signature database to be continuously updated to include new attacks.
Anomaly-based detection systems model user behavior to determine the
characteristics of a user’s normal behavior [2]. During the detection phase, anomalybased systems record and analyze user activities and compare this against their normal
behavior model. A deviation from the established behavior model is considered an
anomaly, or an indication of a possible attack. Often a threshold value is used to define
how much deviation will be required before an anomaly is considered an intrusion.
Anomaly-based detection systems can detect both known and unknown attacks, provided
that the attacker’s behavior is significantly different from that of the normal user.
One major challenge of the anomaly-based approach is to model normal behavior.
To construct such a model, we must extract distinct characteristics of user behavior. We
should also collect a sufficient amount of user behavior data for training purposes. Of
course, the user behavior data must be collected under conditions where no intrusion is in
progress [2]. A threshold value is needed to indicate how much deviation will be
considered as an intrusion. Selecting a threshold value presents a tradeoff between the
false position rate and the false negative rate.
2

User behavior will almost certainly change over time. Without an updating
mechanism, an established behavior model will become obsolete, resulting in a large
number of false positives. To overcome this problem, most anomaly-based IDSs will
update to a new “normal” so that the model can adapt to changes. While this approach
deals with the normal user’s changing behavior problem, it also leaves a potential
security loophole. An intruder can cheat an IDS into believing he is a legitimate user by
acting like a normal user and only gradually changing his behavior [2].

1.1.2. Performance Criteria

In most anomaly-based IDSs, there is a mechanism to score test data, and a
threshold value is set to determine whether a piece of data is more likely from an original
user or an intrusion user. For example, given a threshold value, if an input is evaluated to
have a score higher than the threshold, this input will be categorized as normal data;
otherwise, it will be treated as intrusion data.
The threshold value has a significant opposite effect on the false positive (false
alarm) rate and the false negative (miss target) rate. If we increase the threshold to catch
more intrusion data, the false negative rate will decline; however, the false positive rate
will increase since more normal data will be categorized as intrusion data. Conversely, if
we lower the threshold, the false negative rate will increase but the false positive rate will
decrease. Therefore, the threshold value presents a tradeoff between the false positive rate
and false negative rate, since neither high false positive rate nor high false negative rate is
desirable. High false negative rate leaves many intrusions uncaught, making IDSs
3

useless. High false positive rate, on the other hand, floods IDSs with a large amount of
false alarms, eventually causing administrators to ignore true intrusion alarms along with
false alarms.
To better compare the performance amongst different intrusion detection
techniques, we use the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve [10] and scatter
charts to analyze masquerade detection results. The ROC chart shows the overall
detection results for all users, which is useful to compare false positive rates and false
negative rates as the threshold value changes. The scatter charts show the detection
results of all individual users.

1.2. Masquerade Detection
In this project, we have studied masquerade detection, a specific case of anomalybased IDS in the UNIX command environment. Note that we use masquerade detection
and intrusion detection interchangeably in this report. A masquerader in computer
intrusion detection is a person who uses other’s computer account [3]. The fundamental
assumption of masquerade detection is that each user has his unique characteristics when
invoking command sequences. Hence an intrusion likely occurs when there is a
significant difference from a user’s previous characteristics.

1.2.1. Architecture of a Masquerade Detection System

Figure 1: shows a general architecture of a masquerade detection system. The
essential part is to model user normal behavior. Once such a model is constructed, it is
4

relatively easy to evaluate test data. A good model must preserve the distinct
characteristics of each user but ignore trivial information. In masquerade detection, users’
historical commands are collected and stored, and then users’ ongoing commands are
examined based on their historical data.

Figure 1:

A general architecture of masquerade detection

1.2.2. Schonlau Data Set

Dr. Schonlau has collected masquerading user data for the training and testing
purposes for masquerade detection [8]. Figure 2: illustrates the structure of Schonlau data
set. This data set consists of 50 data files, one file per user. In each file, there are 15,000
commands (collected using the UNIX audit tool, acct [18]). The first 5000 commands are
from an original user and these commands are intended to serve as training data. The
5

following 10,000 commands are seeded with a masquerader user’s commands, and they
are intended to serve as test data. The test data can be viewed as 100 command blocks,
with 100 commands in each block.

User 1

User 2

User 3

User 50

Training Data:

Test Data:

B1
B2

100 blocks,
100 cmds / block,

B100
Figure 2:

Schonlau Data Set

Schonlau data set contains a map file for the locations of the masqueraded blocks.
Figure 3: demonstrates the structure of the map file. The map file contains 100 rows and
50 columns. Each column corresponds to one user, and each row corresponds to a test
block. The entries of the map file are set to either 0 or 1. The value of 0 indicates the
commands on the corresponding block are not contaminated by a masquerader, and the
value of 1 indicates they are contaminated.
The training data provided by Schonlau data set contains only normal behaviors
but no intrusion behavior. This is sufficient for masquerade detection since it is a specific
case of anomaly-based techniques, which do not require signature of intrusion behaviors.
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User 1
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1: commands in the

.

.

block

.

.
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.

.

block come from the
original user.
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come

from

Location of the masquerades

1.3. Project Road Map
This project is focused on different masquerade detection techniques with
Schonlau data set as the primary source of training and test data. The goal of this project
is to gain an insight on the detection results of different models and to propose a novel
model of masquerade detection.
The original project idea was inspired by the similarity between simple
substitution cryptanalysis and masquerade detection. Both techniques process
observations and try to reveal their underlying truth. In simple substitution cryptanalysis,
the observations are cipher texts and the truth is plain texts. In masquerade detection, the
observations are test data, and the truth is whether the true identities behind the test data
are masquerade users. Simple substitution cryptanalysis has been studied long before the
intrusion detection, even before the first computer was invented. Due to the similarity
between the two techniques, it is reasonable to apply simple substitution cryptanalysis
techniques to masquerade detection. Specifically, we are interested in the normal
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behavior modeling techniques and the evaluation functions used by simple substitution
cryptanalysis. In Section 2, we present an overview of simple substitution cryptanalysis.
We have reviewed literatures to learn techniques used in simple substitution
cryptanalysis, including n-gram frequencies [13,14], double letter, short word patterns,
observing syntactic and semantic, relaxation algorithms [19], hidden Markov models
(HMMs), genetic algorithms, and dictionary [20,7]. We have analyzed the feasibility of
applying these techniques to masquerade detection and found that not all these techniques
can be applied. For example, double letter pattern is very useful during word guessing,
but the same pattern is not commonly seen in user command sequences. Language
semantic is also used to attack simple substitution ciphers. However, it is hard to apply
such information to masquerade detection since there are no apparent corresponding
semantic for user command sequences. In this project, we have used n-gram frequencies
and HMMs to solve masquerade detection.
N-gram frequency statistics is the most fundamental technique to simple
substitution cryptanalysis. It has been applied to masquerade detection by treating a
command in masquerade detection as a letter in the simple substitution cipher [13, 14].
Intuitively, if a user uses one command frequently now, it is likely for the user to use this
command in the near future. Furthermore, if a user executes a group of commands in a
certain order, it is also likely for the user to remain this behavior pattern. Thus, it is
reasonable to construct a model using the current behaviors and to detect whether the
future behaviors fit the trained model. Section 3 describes our work on n-gram frequency
statistics for masquerade detection.

8

HMMs are widely used to uncover hidden states by analyzing a sequence of
observations in many areas, such as speech recognition, machine translation, and
cryptanalysis. Two HMMs have been studied on Schonlau data set [8] but no sensitive
analysis was presented on the key parameters of the HMMs. We have implemented our
own configurable HMM and conducted sensitive analysis on the parameters such as the
number of states. Section 4 provides a detailed description of applying HMMs to
masquerade detection.
An important goal of this project is to design a novel approach for masquerade
detection. To our knowledge, there was no study on using profile hidden Markov models
(PHMMs) for masquerade detection. PHMMs are commonly used in bioinformatics to
effectively find out whether protein sequences are closely related. Unlike HMMs,
PHMMs make an explicit use of position information [5]. In the context of masquerade
detection, the position represents the order in which a user performs tasks. If a user
usually performs tasks in a certain order, PHMMs may be able to take advantage of this
position information. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that PHMMs may perform well on
masquerade detection. We have designed and implemented PHMMs for masquerade
detection, and conducted analysis on experimental results (see Section 5).
After analyzing the detection results, we have found that the PHMMs do not
perform as well as the HMMs. We conjectured that it was due to the fact that Schonlau
data set lacks session starting and ending information required by the PHMMs.
Therefore, we have designed and implemented a model to generate user data with
position information. We have found that when there is no sufficient training data, the

9

PHMMs considerably outperform the corresponding HMMs since the generated position
information is significantly helpful for the PHMMs.

2. Simple Substitution Cryptanalysis

2.1. Simple Substitution Cipher
Simple substitution cipher is one of the oldest cipher systems. In a simple
substitution cipher, each letter of the plaintext is substituted by another letter. Usually,
there is a one-to-one mapping between the letters in the plaintext and the ciphertext.
TABLE I: shows an example of simple substitution letter mapping, where the plaintext
letters are represented in lower case and the ciphertext letters in upper case, following the
convention [2].
TABLE I: AN EXAMPLE OF SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION LETTER MAPPING
Plaintext

a b C d e f g H i J k l m n O p q r s t u v WX y z

ciphertext Z P B Y J R G K F L X Q N W V D H M C U T O I A E S

Using this letter mapping, the plaintext message of simplesubstitutioncipher
is encrypted into the ciphertext of

CFNDQJCTPCUFUTUFVWBFDKJM

by substituting each letter in the plaintext row with the corresponding letter in the
ciphertext row.
To decode the ciphertext message, we can reverse the process by replacing each letter in
the ciphertext row with the corresponding letter in the plaintext. For example,
the ciphertext message of

ZWVNZQEPZCJYFWUMTCFVWYJUJBUFVW

will be deciphered as

anomalybasedintrusiondetection.
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2.2. Breaking Simple Substitution Ciphers
As shown in TABLE I:, every permutation of the 26 letters can serve as a simple
substitution key. Therefore, the simple substitution has a large key space of 26! (~288.4)
since there are 26! permutations in total. However, even with such a huge key space,
simple substitution is not sufficiently secure. It can be relatively easy to manually break
such a ciphertext by analyzing the letter frequencies and guessing the common words [2].
For example, the attacker can use English letter frequencies as shown in Figure 4: [2].
The nine most frequent letters in English are E, T, A, O, I, N, S, H, and R. After
calculating and sorting the letter frequencies in the ciphertext message, an attacker can
come up with pretty good guessing by substituting the most frequent letter in the
ciphertext with “E”, the second most frequent letter with “T”, and so on. This approach
provides a good start point even if the letter frequencies in the cipthertext may not exactly
match the English letter frequencies. In addition, an attacker can adjust the mapping by
analyzing the pattern of the letters to guess some common words. For example, happy
and hello have the same letter pattern of ABCCD.
English Letter Frequency
14.00%
12.70%

12.00%

10.00%
Frequency

9.06%
8.17%

8.00%

7.51%
6.97%

6.75%
6.33%
5.99%

6.09%

6.00%
4.25%

4.03%

4.00%
2.78%

2.76%

2.41%

2.23%
2.02%

2.00%

2.36%

1.97%

1.93%

1.49%
0.98%

0.77%
0.15%

0.15%

0.10%

0.07%

0.00%
a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

letters

Figure 4:

English Letter Frequencies

11

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

The above process is a manual schema to break simple substitution ciphers. This
manual process requires an attacker to have some knowledge of English to evaluate how
sensible a half-broken ciphertext is. To automate the breaking process, a grading method
is needed for such an evaluation. To accomplish this task, a decipher system can use
much statistics information of the English language, such as the letter frequency counts,
bigram frequencies, the most frequent used words, and English grammars. If the grading
method is efficient, the decipher system can gradually adjust the key mapping to improve
the score of the intermediate deciphered text. Eventually, the decipher system will output
a candidate list of plaintexts with high scores. There is a good chance that the original
plaintext is amongst the candidate list.

3. Frequency Statistics

3.1.

N-gram: Unigram, Bigram, Trigram, and N-gram
Most grading algorithms for simple substitution deciphers are based on N-gram

frequencies. An N-gram is a subsequence of n items from a given sequence [13]. An Ngram frequency is the number of the occurrence for an N-gram unit. The 1-gram, 2-gram,
and 3-gram are often referred to as unigram, bigram, and trigram, respectively. In the
example of Section 2.2, the key mapping guessing is based the English letter frequencies,
which is an instant of unigram. Bigram frequency of English letters is used in [6].
TABLE II: shows various n-gram units generated from the command sequence: “sh xrdb
mkpts env csh csh sh csh kill”.

12

Command
sequence

TABLE II: N-GRAM EXAMPLES FOR A COMMAND SEQUENCE
sh xrdb mkpts env csh csh sh csh kill

unigram

Sh, xrdb, mkpts, env, csh, csh, sh, csh, kill

bigram

sh xrdb, xrdb mkpts, mkpts env, env csh, csh csh, csh sh, sh csh,
csh kill

trigram

sh xrdb mkpts, xrdb mkpts env, mkpts env csh, env csh csh,
csh csh sh, csh sh csh, sh csh kill

4-gram

sh xrdb mkpts env, xrdb mkpts env csh, mkpts env csh csh, env
csh csh sh, csh csh sh csh, csh sh csh kill

To grade a command sequence by using N-gram frequencies, we need to slice the
command sequence into N-gram subsequences. Take trigram for example, the command
sequence in TABLE II: will be sliced into the trigram items of “sh xrdb mkpts”, “xrdb
mkpts env”, …, and “sh csh kill”.
To compute the grading score, we have constructed two frequency lookup tables:
the profile lookup table and the command-sequence lookup table. The profile lookup
table stores the frequency counts of users’ profiles (i.e., training data). The commandsequence lookup table contains the frequency counts of the command sequences to be
evaluated. We use a simple evaluation function to calculate the score for a command
sequence:
S=

k

∑( f
i =1

ui

− f ci ) 2

( 3.1 )

where f ci is the normalized frequency count of the ith N-gram item in the commandsequence lookup table, f ui is the normalized frequency count in the profile lookup table
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corresponding to the f ci , and k is the total number of items in the command-sequence
lookup table.
We have tested the unigram, bigram, and trigram frequencies. Both f ci and f ui
are normalized to 100. For example, if the training data for a user contains 5,000
commands, the frequency counts will be divided by 50 to be normalized to 100. In this
scoring model, a lower score indicates a higher similarity between the training data and
test data.
We have calculated the metrics of false negative rates and false positive rates for
1-gram, 2-gram and 3-gram. The false negative rate measures the percentage of actual
intrusion uncaught by the IDS. The false positive rate measures the percentage of normal
activities that have been recognized as intrusions. See Section 3.2.1 for the experimental
results.
To improve the detection results, we add weights to commands since each
command is not equally important to every user. We have measured the command weight
from two perspectives: 1) the frequency percentage of a command used by each user, 2)
the uniqueness of a command to a user.
In terms of the frequency percentage of a command used by each user, we first
count the frequency of a particular command used by all users, and then calculate the
percentage usage of that command for each user. If a command is used extensively by
one user, we assign a higher weight of the command to that user. Intuitively, we have

F
CiUj
wCiUj = F
CiG
14

( 3.2 )

where Ci represents the ith N-gram command sequence in the test data, Uj represents the
user j.

wCiUj

is the weight of Ci for user j.

training data of user j.

F CiG

F CiUj is the frequency count of Ci in the

is the frequency count of Ci in the training data of all

users.
Regarding to the uniqueness of a command to a user, if a command is only used
by a particular user, then this command is unique to the user. Thus this command should
be granted a higher weight. On the other hand, a command used by all users indicates that
this is a general command. Since this command carries few characteristics of the user, it
should be granted a lower weight. To calculate the uniqueness, we have

wCi

=

M

(3.3)

mCi

where Ci represents the ith N-gram command sequence in the test data,
uniqueness of Ci, M is the number of all users, and

wCi

is the

mCi is the number of users who

have used Ci.
These two weighted equations are the simplest ways to compute the significance
of an N-gram to a user. More sophisticated calculations have been presented in [13] and
[14]. We have experimented with the weighted schemes defined on equation (3.2) and
(3.3) for N-gram detection (see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 for the detection results).
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3.2. Experimental Results

3.2.1. 1-gram, 2-gram, and 3-gram

Figure 5: shows the detection results using 1-gram, 2-gram, and 3-gram
frequencies. The x axis are the logarithmic values of false positive rates since we are
more interested in the detection performance on the lower end of false positive rates, such
as less than 5 percent. For convenience, in this report, we denote the region with false
positive rates less than 5 percent as the useful zone. A high false positive rate is not
practical even though it may be associated with low false negative rates. From Figure 5:,
we see that the false negative rates in the useful zone are too high (greater than 70%) to
put these n-grams into any practical use.

3-Gram

1-Gram
2-Gram

Useful Zone

Figure 5:

The detection results using 1-gram, 2-gram, and 3-gram
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3.2.2. N-gram Weighted by Percentage of Command Usage

Figure 6: shows the detection results of adding the percentage of command usage
statistics (defined by (3.2)) to the N-gram models. 1-Gram, 2-Gram, and 3-Gram
represent the results of un-weighted N-Gram, while 1-GramCG, 2-GramCG, and 3GramCG represent the results of weighted N-Gram. From Figure 6:, we see that weighted
N-grams significantly outperform the un-weighted versions.

Unweighted
N-Grams

Command Usage
Weighted N-Grams

Figure 6:

N-grams weighted by percentage of command usage vs. un-weighted Ngrams

Note that in the weighted N-Grams, there are some areas with undefined false
negative rates when these rates are smaller than some threshold values. For example, the
region of false positive rates between 0.1% and 1% is blank for 1-GramCG, and so is the
region between 0.1% and 5 % for 3-GramCG. Since we will encounter similar situations
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later when we analyze other models, it is worthwhile to investigate why there are such
blank areas, and what can be done to eliminate or reduce these areas.
To better understand this problem, let us look at the test data scores from a
different perspective. Figure 7: shows the test data scores for User 9. A green diamond
represents a normal command block, and a red circle represents a masqueraded command
block. The x axis represents the block ids for the 100 test command blocks, and the y axis
is the evaluation score for each block. As shown Figure 7:, numerous normal and
masqueraded command blocks have been evaluated to the same minimum score of 50,
which eventually results in blank areas. The detailed reason goes as follows. During the
process of analyzing false positive rates and false negative rates, we gradually change the
threshold values to compute these two rates. If we set the threshold value to the minimum
score, the IDS will treat every command block as normal data, and therefore, the false
negative rate will be 100%. Note that 100% false negative rate is discarded since it
carries no useful information. When we slightly increase the threshold value, all these
blocks with the same minimum score will be excluded, leading to a dramatic change of
false positive rates and false negative rates and resulting in the blank areas as shown in
Figure 6:.
We have proposed a fine-tuning approach to eliminate or reduce the blank areas.
Specifically, we fine tune the evaluation function so that different command blocks will
be evaluated to different score values. Unique values can avoid the dramatic change of
false positive rates and false negative rates when threshold is adjusted. The drawback of
this method is that there is no universal solution for fine tuning and thus it is time
consuming to perform such a task.
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Figure 7:

An example of detection results for User 9

3.2.3. N-gram with User Uniqueness

Figure 8: shows the results of adding the uniqueness (defined by (3.3)) to the Ngram. 1-Gram and 3-Gram represent the results of un-weighted N-Gram; 1-GramCG and
3-GramCG represent the results of command usage weighted N-Gram; and 1-GramTF, 3GramTF represent the results of uniqueness weighted N-Gram. From Figure 8:, we see
that the detection results of the uniqueness weighted N-Gram outperform those of the two
previous methods.
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Unweighted 1Gram

Command usage
weighted 1-Gram

Uniqueness
Weighted
N-Grams

Figure 8:

N-gram weighted by uniqueness vs. N-gram weighted by command
usage vs. un-weighted N-gram

3.2.4. Conclusions

We have implemented the N-gram models for masquerade detection. We have
also analyzed the effects of weighting two factors: 1) the frequency percentage of a
command used by each user, 2) the uniqueness of a command to a user. The experimental
results show that the false negative rates for weighted N-gram drop significantly while
the false positive rates are comparable to those for the un-weighted versions. In
particular, the uniqueness weighted N-Gram yields the best performance.
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4. HMM: Introduction

4.1. Markov Chain
A Markov chain is a random process of generating a sequence of states using state
transition statistics. In a classical Markov chain, the property of the next state depends
only on the current state. This model is also known as a first order Markov chain. There
are also higher order Markov chains, in which the property of the next state depends not
only on the current state but also on previous states. In this report, we are focused on first
order Markov chains.

Figure 9:

A Markov chain of a computer sharing pattern

Figure 9: shows an example of a Markov chain for a computer sharing pattern. It
is assumed that there is only one computer available and this computer is shared by three
users, User1, User2, and User3. The usage of this computer is slotted into 15 minutes per
unit. Once a user gets the right to use the computer, she/he can use it exclusively for a
slot of 15 minutes. When the current slot times out, a new user will be selected for the
next time slot. We call one unit time being used by a user a state, which is represented as
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a circle in the graph. Thus, there are three states in the system, determined by the user
(i.e., User1, User2, and User3).
Assume that we observe the pattern how the users share the computer. For
example, if User1 is using the computer in the current timeslot, the probability of User2
will use the computer on the next timeslot is 30%. This relationship is represented as an
arrow from User1 to User2, and the probability value 0.3 is associated with the arrow in
Figure 9:. In this example, the transition probability from the current state to the next
state depends only on the current state, regardless of the previous states. The transition
probability of a Markov chain is formally defined as [5]:

a xn xn +1 = P( X

n +1

= x | X 1 = x1 , X 2 = x 2 ,..., X n = x n ) = P ( X n +1 = x | X n = x n )

(4.1)

where xi ∈ a countable state set S and Xi is the ith observed state in a Markov chain.
An N*N state transition matrix, denoted as A, is used to describe the transition
probabilities amongst all states, where N is the number of states. For example, the state
transition matrix A for Figure 9: is

 0 .5 0 .3 0 .2 
A = 0.4 0.2 0.4
0.3 0.3 0.4
Consider the probability for a given state sequence xn , xn −1 ,..., x1 on a specified Markov
chain. This probability is determined by the states and the associated state transition
probability matrix [5]:
P(x) = P ( xn , xn −1 ,..., x1 )
=P ( xn | xn −1 ,..., x1 ) P( xn −1 | xn − 2 ,..., x1 )…P( x1 )
=P ( xn | xn −1 )P( xn −1 | xn − 2 )…P( x 2 | x1 )P( x1 )
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n

=P( x1 ) ∏ a x x
i −1 i
i=2

(4.2)

The “start” and “end” states can be added to a Markov chain to model both ends of an
observation sequence. Figure 10: shows such an example.

Figure 10: Start and End States are added to the Markov Chain.

4.2. Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
In a regular Markov Model, states are directly visible to the observer. However, in
an HMM, states are not directly visible. Instead, only the output, dependent on the states,
is visible [11].
To demonstrate a HMM, we modify the previous example. Suppose we would
like to track if a user, say User1, is using the computer during a period of time. Assume
that the users remotely log in to the computer and we cannot be sure who is using the
computer (e.g., the user id may be compromised). To track the usage history of User1, we
only consider two states, “User1” and “not User1” as shown in Figure 11:. The “User1”
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state means that User1 is using the computer, and “not User1” means another user is
using the computer. The state transition, denoted by A, can be summarized as:

 0 .2 0 .8 
A=

 0 .4 0 .6 

(4.3)

Figure 11: An HMM of a computer sharing pattern
Although we cannot directly see who is in front of the computer, we can observe
the command sequences issued by the user. In this example, the commands are the
observations. Suppose that we can characterize the user behavior patterns by analyzing
the user history command sequences. For example, we have knowledge of what
commands each user usually uses and the frequency of each command being used. As
shown in Figure 11:, an arrow with a probability value is used to represent the
relationship between a state and an observation. For example, the probability of User1 to
issue a send email command is 20%. An N*M observation matrix is used to represented
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the probabilities of all observations issued by states, where N is the number of states and
M, the number of observation symbols. The observation matrix, denoted by B, in the
Figure 11:can be summarized as:

0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3
B=

 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1

(4.4)

To establish an HMM, we need one more matrix π to indicate the initial state
distribution. The initial state distribution in the Figure 11: is

π = [0.6 0.4]

(4.5)

Once we have the state transition probability matrix A, observation matrix B, and
the initial state distribution matrix π , we are ready to define an HMM. Before we show
the definition of an HMM, let us first look at the following notation [12].
Let
T = the length of the observation sequence
Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qN−1} = the states of the Markov process
V = {0, 1, . . . ,M −1} = set of possible observations
N = |Q| = the number of states in the model
M = |V| = the number of observation symbols

A = the state transition probabilities
B = the observation probability matrix

π = the initial state distribution
O = (O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1) = observation sequence.
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The observations are denoted by {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}, and Oi ∈ V for i = 0, 1, . . . , T−1.
Figure 12: illustrates a generic HMM [12]. The Markov process is determined by
the initial state distribution matrix, π , and the state transition matrix, A. This process is
hidden, and we can only observe the observation sequence. The observations are
determined by the state transition matrix, A, and the observation probability matrix, B. An
HMM can be defined by A, B, and π , and M, N implied by the matrices, i.e.,

λ = ( A, B, π ) [12].

Figure 12: A generic HMM
An HMM can be used to solve three types of problems [12].
Problem 1: Determine the likelihood of an observed sequence O. In this
problem, the input is an HMM λ = ( A, B, π ) and O; and the output is P(O| λ ).
Problem 2: Reveal the hidden state sequence of an HMM. Here, the input
is the same as Problem1, i.e., an HMM λ = ( A, B, π ) and O; but the desirable output is to
find an optimal state sequence.
Problem 3: Train an HMM to best fit the observations. The input is a
given observation sequence O and the values of M and N. The output is to find the model

λ = ( A, B, π ) maximizing the probability of O.
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4.3. Implementation
In this project, we have constructed an HMM using the training data (Problem 3),
and then used the created model to compute the likelihood of the test data (Problem 1). A
high probability score indicates similar characteristics between the training data and the
test data, and thus the test data will be recognized as normal data. A low probability
score, on the other hand, indicates significant difference between the training data and the
test data, and therefore the test data will be recognized as intrusion data. Once we get the
probability scores, we can compute false positive rates and false negative rates by
gradually varying the threshold value.

4.4. Experimental Results

4.4.1. The Detection Results of HMMs with 2 States, 4 States and 6 States

When we build an HMM from the training data, the number of states is the
parameter we can change. Since we cannot directly know how many states an underlying
model of the training command sequence has, we have trained HMMs with 2 states, 4
states and 6 states. Figure 13: shows that these three HMMs yield almost the same
detection results in the lower false positive rate region. The model with 2 states performs
slightly better than the other two. Naturally, in the following sections when we compare
HMMs with other models, we use the results of the HMM with 2 states.
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4 States

2 States
6 States

Figure 13: The detection results of HMMs with 2 states, 4 states, and 6 states.

4.4.2. HMM vs. N-Gram

Figure 14: shows the detection results of the HMM vs. those of the uniqueness
weighted N-Grams. In the region of false positive rates between 0.1% and 1%, the HMM
has a similar detection result as the uniqueness weighted 1-Gram. But the HMM performs
better than the uniqueness weighted N-Grams in the region between 1% and 5%. As
discussed in Section 3.2.3, the uniqueness weighted N-Grams yield best results provided
by the N-Gram models. Thus, the HMM model outperforms the N-Gram models in the
useful zone.
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Uniqueness Weighted
N-Grams

HMM
Results

Figure 14: The detection results of the HMM vs. uniqueness weighted N-Grams

4.4.3. Conclusions

We have implemented an HMM for masquerade detection. We have conducted
sensitivity analysis on the number of states for the HMM and conclude that the number of
states has no significant effect on the detection results. We have also compared the
detection results of the HMM with those of the uniqueness weighted N-Grams, the best
results provided by the N-Gram models. We conclude that the HMM yields better
detection results than the N-Gram models.
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5. Profile Hidden Markov Model (PHMM)

5.1. Overview
A PHMM is a specific type of an HMM that adds an additional dimension of
position in the original HMM. Specifically, a PHMM consists of a sequence of positions
(or more precisely, states), and there is an HMM associated with each position.
A typical way of constructing a PHMM is to generate a multiple sequence
alignment (MSA) from training data, and then to build the PHMM upon the MSA [15]. It
takes several steps to obtain the MSA from training command sequences, and several
more steps to build the PHMM on the MSA (see Figure 15: for the architecture of
masquerade detection using a PHMM).
Here, we outline the steps of constructing a PHMM for masquerade detection
(detailed procedure is described in the following sections):
1. Write a module to find the optimal pairwise alignments for two given command
sequences:
1.1. Generate a substitution matrix to provide the match/mismatch scores when
aligning two symbols.
1.2. Define a gap penalty function to measure the cost of aligning a symbol with
a gap.
1.3. Given the substation matrix and the gap penalty function for score
calculation, use the dynamic programming algorithm to find the optimal
local/global pairwise alignments with the highest score.
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Figure 15: The architecture of masquerade detection using a PHMM
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2. Generate the MSA from the training command sequences. Specifically, for each
training command sequence, perform the following operations:
2.1.

Divide the command sequence into n subsequences.

2.2.

Find the pairwise alignments for all possible pairs amongst the command
sequence and record their alignment scores in an n*n score matrix.

2.3.

Generate a minimum spanning tree from the score matrix. Designate one
of the sequences with the highest pairwise alignment score as the root of
the tree.

2.4.

Add subsequences to the MSA following the order that they are added to
the minimum spanning tree.

3. Construct the PHMM using the obtained MSA.
3.1.

Determine the state for each position in the MSA.

3.2.

Calculate the emission probabilities for the states.

3.3.

Calculate the transition probabilities for the states.

4. Given a PHMM, calculate the probability for test data and analyze the detection
results:
4.1. Use the forward algorithm to score the test data.
4.2. Compute false positive rates and false negative rates for different
threshold values.
4.3. Process the results and generate the charts
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5.2. Implementation Details

5.2.1. Pairwise Alignment

When analyzing sequences, one of the most basic tasks is to find out whether two
sequences are related [5]. Usually this task is divided into two steps:
1. Aligning the two sequences (this is often referred to as pairwise alignment),
2. Determining whether the two sequences are related based on the alignment
results.
There are two types of pairwise alignments, local alignment and global alignment.
Dynamic programming technique is the most commonly used method to find a pairwise
alignment, since it guarantees to find the optimal match. Before using dynamic
programming, we need to define a scoring model to compute the alignment score (or
cost). Usually this is done by defining substitution matrices and gap penalty functions [5].
Substitution matrices are used to score the match and mismatch of two symbols. Gap
penalty functions are used to measure the penalty for a symbol in one sequence to match
to a gap in the other sequence.

5.2.1.1. Substitution Matrix

The basics idea of the dynamic programming algorithm is to perform command
alignment by maximizing the alignment score. Therefore, we need a method to penalize a
mismatch when the two aligning commands are not identical. A simple approach is to
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treat all the mismatches as equally bad and then we can put a constant penalty for these
mismatches. However, in reality, the effects of mismatches are often different and thus
variable penalty should be considered. A typical way to implement variable penalty is to
use an n*n substitution matrix S, where n is the number of the distinct commands used by
the user. This matrix defines the scores of all possible pairs for a command to align to any
other commands.
TABLE III: shows an example substitution matrix S based on Schonlau data set.
A typical user in this data set uses 70 to 140 distinct commands. To simplify the example,
we only consider 5 commands, say “send Email”, “Browse news”, “play Game”, “C
programming”, and “Java programming”. These 5 commands are abbreviated as E, B G,
C, and J, respectively.
TABLE III:
E
B
G
C
J

AN EXAMPLE SUBSTITUTION MATRIX
E B G C
J
9 5 -4 2
2
4 8 -5 3
3
-4 4 9 -5 -4
2 2 -5 10 7
2 2 -5 7
10

In TABLE III:, the elements on the diagonal represent matches, and therefore
have higher scores. The other elements represent mismatches, and thus have lower
scores. Amongst the mismatches, we consider “C programming” and “Java
programming” as closely related. Therefore, substituting “C programming” with “Java
programming” receives small penalty with a high score of 7. In contrast, playing game is
not closely related with programming and thus substituting “C programming” with “play
Game” gets a high penalty with a low score of -5.
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It should be noted that it is complicated to objectively define the relationship between any
two UNIX commands. There are thousands of UNIX commands and to our knowledge
there is no such study on the correlation amongst commands. Intuitively, each command
has different significance for different user. Therefore, we have proposed to use the
command significance to define the mismatch scores.

5.2.1.2. Gap Penalty

To generate a pairwise alignment, it is indispensable to have gaps unless the two
given sequences are already optimally aligned. Hence, besides the match or mismatch,
we should consider an additional case of aligning a command in one sequence to a gap in
the other sequence. A natural question is how we should penalize the gaps. Intuitively,
we should take in account the number of gaps and the length of each gap subsequence.
There are two schemes for calculating the cost associated with an open gap [11]: linear
score,
f ( g ) = − gd ,
and affine score,
f ( g ) = − d − ( g − 1)e ,
where g is the length of the gap, d is gap open penalty, and e is gap extension penalty.
The linear score schema is a specific case of the affine score scheme with d = e. To
penalize a new gap more than extending an existing one, we can give d a higher value
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than e. Therefore, we have used the affine score for gap penalties in masquerade
detection where some gaps in the sequences can be quite long.

5.2.1.3. Global Alignment and Local Alignment

There are two types of pairwise alignments to maximize alignment scores: global
alignment and local alignment. Global alignment aligns every symbol while local
alignment can align only the middle subsequence by discarding the beginning and ending
subsequences with negative scores. Figure 16: lists two sequences and the corresponding
global and local alignments.

Figure 16: Global alignment and local alignment
Compared with local alignment, global alignment has an advantage of lossless
information because every symbol is kept. However, global alignment may introduce too
many gaps into the alignment, resulting in a less characterized alignment. Therefore,
global alignment is suitable when two sequences are similar and have roughly equal
lengths [17]. On the other hand, local alignment has an advantage of finding the most
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common characterized subsequence when there is a significant difference between the
overall characteristics of the two sequences. However, some significant information may
be lost since local alignment may ignore the beginning and ending portions of the two
sequences.
We have conducted some experiments on Schonlau training data and found that
the command sequences have a low-degree similarity set. Therefore, we have used the
local alignment to extract common features from the training data to generate the
pairwise alignment.

5.2.2. Multiple Sequence Alignment (MSA)

As the name suggests, an MSA is an alignment of multiple sequences (See Figure
17: for an example of an MSA). A PHMM is constructed based on an MSA. This section
describes the procedure of generating an MSA from Schonlau training data.

Figure 17: An example MSA

5.2.2.1. Preprocess Training Data to Get Multiple Sequences.
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Schonlau training data provides a long list of 5000 commands for each user. To
generate an MSA, we first need to obtain multiple sequences from this long list of raw
data. We can divide the long list into multiple sequences by selecting some suitable
dividing points. Intuitively, there is a tradeoff between the sequence length and the
number of sequences. On one hand, too many sequences will generate numerous gaps in
the alignments. On the other hand, if there are only a few relatively long sequences, then
each state in the constructed PHMM has too few symbols to generate useful emission
probabilities. We have generated 6 different multiple sequences based on the combination
of the number of sequence and the length of the sequence as listed in TABLE IV:. These
experimental results are provided and analyzed in Section 5.3.1
TABLE IV: EXPERIMENT CASES OF GENERATING MULTIPLE SEQUENCES
Case Number Number of Sequence Length of Sequence
1
4
1250
2
5
1000
3
8
625
4
10
500
5
20
250
6
50
100

5.2.2.2. Generate Pairwise Alignments

After obtaining multiple command sequences, we need to perform pairwise
alignments for all possible pairs. We use the local alignment algorithm, substitution
matrix, and penalty function defined in Section 5.2.1. In total, there are n*(n-1)
alignments, where n is the number of command sequences. We also save the alignment
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score of all the pairwise alignments in an n*n score matrix. The values on the diagonal of
the score matrix are not used since we do not need to align a sequence to itself.

5.2.2.3. Generate MSA

We have implemented two different approaches to generate an MSA based on the
pairwise alignments. The first approach is to add all the pairwise alignments into the
MSA. In this approach, if there are n sequences, the MSA will contain n*(n-1)
alignments.
Instead of adding all the pairwise alignments into the MSA at the beginning, the
second approach is to gradually merge each sequence into the MSA. One solution for
determining the order of adding the sequences to the MSA is to generate a minimum
spanning tree from the score matrix. The sequence with the highest pairwise alignment
score is designated as the root of the minimum spanning tree. Once we have the spanning
tree, we can add sequences to the MSA in the order determined by the spanning tree. We
have used Prim’s algorithm to generate the minimum spanning tree.
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5.2.3. Create PHMM

5.2.3.1. Determine MSA States

Figure 18: shows the architecture of a PHMM. A PHMM can be viewed as adding
a position dimension into a standard HMM. At each position, there are three kinds of
states: match, insert, and delete states. In Figure 18:, the match, insert, and delete states
are represented by squares, diamonds, and circles, respectively. These three states
correspond to the states in a standard HMM.

Figure 18: The architecture of a PHMM
Each symbol (e.g., commands in this project) in a PHMM belongs to either a
match state or an insert state. A gap in a match state represents a deletion sate. To create a
PHMM, we need to find out which columns (or positions) in the MSA form the match
and insert states [15]. Columns with more symbols than gaps are considered as match
states; otherwise, insert states [5]. Figure 19: shows an example of how to determine
states for an MSA. While a match state consists of only one column (e.g. M1, M2…), an
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insert state can contain multiple columns because the contiguous insert states are merged
(e.g. I2).

Figure 19: Determine MSA states

5.2.3.2. Calculate State Emission Probabilities

Each symbol in the MSA represents an emission. After the states are determined
in the MSA, we can compute the state emission probabilities. For example, in Figure 19:,
we can compute the probability of match state M1 by counting the frequency for each
symbol:

eM 1 ( B) = 0 / 4 , eM 1 (C ) = 2 / 4 , eM 1 (G ) = 0 / 4 , eM 1 ( I ) = 2 / 4 .
To overcome the over-fitting problem, a common approach is to use “add-one
rule” to eliminate the zero probabilities [5]. After applying the add-one rule, we have

eM 1 ( B) = 1 /(4 + 4) = 1 / 8 , eM 1 (C ) = (2 + 1) /(4 + 4) = 3 / 8 ,
eM 1 (G ) = 1 /(4 + 4) = 1 / 8 , eM 1 ( I ) = (2 + 1) /(4 + 4) = 3 / 8 .
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Similarly, the emission probabilities for the insert state I2 are calculated as:

eI 2 ( B) = (2 + 1) /(6 + 4) = 3 / 10 , eI 2 (C ) = (1 + 1) /(6 + 4) = 2 / 10 ,
eI 2 (G ) = (3 + 1) /(6 + 4) = 4 / 10 , eI 2 ( I ) = (0 + 1) /(6 + 4) = 1 / 10 .
Given an MSA, we compute the probabilities for all match and insert states and
store the results in an emission matrix E. Matrix E corresponds to the Matrix B in the
standard HMM, with the difference that Matrix E is position dependent. For an MSA
with n match states, the matrix E consists the probabilities of eM 1 , eM 2 … eMn , and the
insert states of eI 0 , eI 1 … eIn . For those insert states not presented on the MSA (such as, I0
and I1,), we assign each symbol with equal emission probability. For example,

eI 1 ( B) = 1 / 4 , eI 1 (C ) = 1 / 4 , eI 1 (G ) = 1 / 4 , eI 1 ( I ) = 1 / 4 .

5.2.3.3. Calculate State Transition Probabilities

The state transition probability matrix A in a PHMM corresponds to the one in a
standard HMM, with the difference that transition probabilities in PHMM are positiondependent. The matrix A contains all the transition probabilities from the begin state
(denoted by M0) to the end state (denoted by Mn+1). As shown in Figure 20: [5], A
contains the information associated with all the arrows.
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Figure 20: The state transition structure of a PHMM
The transition probability from state m to state n, denoted by amn , can be
computed by dividing the total number of transitions from state m to any state by the
number of transitions from state m to state n [5]. The add-one rule should also be applied
by adding 1 for match, insert, and delete states. For example, the probabilities for the
states transferring from match states M1 are

aM 1M 2 = (3 + 1) /(4 + 3) = 4 / 7 , aM 1D 2 = (1 + 1) /(4 + 3) = 2 / 7 , aM 1I 2 = (0 + 1) /(4 + 3) = 1 / 7 .

5.2.4. Calculate Test Data Probability and Detection Results

5.2.4.1. Forward Algorithm
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Given a PHMM, we can use the forward algorithm to efficiently calculate the
occurrence probability of an observation. Figure 21: provides the recurrence equation for
the forward algorithm [5]:

Figure 21: The recursion equation of the forward algorithm for a PHMM
Each notation of the above equation is described below:
i: the position in the observation sequence
j: the state position

F jM (i ) : the probability of subsequence x0 , x1 ,…, xi on up to match state j
xi : the ith observation symbol

eMj ( xi ) : the emission probability of observing symbol xi on match state Mj
q xi : the probability of observing symbol xi in a random model
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The base case of the recursion F0M (0) is initialized to 0. F jI (i ) and FjD (i ) are the
probability of the subsequence of x0 , x1 ,…, xi on up to insert and delete state j,
respectively.
We use the above forward algorithm to score an observation sequence against a
PHMM. Given a PHMM with q match states, the final score of an observation sequence
with p symbols is defined as [15]:
Score = log( aMqMq +1 exp( FqM ( p )) + aIqMq +1 exp( FqI ( p )) + aDqMq +1 exp( FqD ( p )) )

(5.1)

We can use this equation to score the test data against the constructed PHMM and save
the scores on the file.

5.3. Experimental Result

5.3.1. Detection Results of Different Subsequence in MSA

As discussed in Section 5.2.2.1, the training data need to be divided into multiple
sequences. We have experimented with several different values of the number of
sequences, ranging from 4 to 50. Figure 22: shows the experimental results. While the
PHMM with 5 sequences in MSA yields the lowest false negative rates in the useful zone,
the overall detection results for these values do not differ significantly.
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5000 training commands divided into
50 sequences

10 sequences

4 sequences

5 sequences

Figure 22: The detection results of PHMMs with different number of subsequences
in MSA

5.3.2. PHMM vs. HMM vs. N-Gram Models

Figure 23: compares the detection results of PHMMs with those of the HMM and
uniqueness weighted N-Gram Models. In the useful zone, the results of PHMM models
are close to those of uniqueness weighted 3-Gram model, but not as good as those of the
HMM.
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Uniqueness weighted
3-Gramdetection results

PHMMs
Detection results

Figure 23: The detection results of PHMM models vs. the HMM model vs. the
uniqueness weighted 3-Gram model
The reasons that the PHMM models do not yield better detection results than the
HMM are multiple-fold. First, in Schonlau data set, there is no session beginning and
ending information available on both the training data and the test data. A PHMM
extensively relies on position information, and thus it is undesirable for the data to lack
the session position information. Without position information, the PHMM would
eventually degrade to HMM. Second, during the process of creating an MSA, some
information is omitted by local alignment operations. Third, unlike protein sequences [5]
or metamorphic viruses [15] where the evolved sequences are in fact from a common
source, user command sequences do not have such a common source. Users might act on
similarly as they previously do but the commands issued by them are not a modification
of a common command sequence. We conjectured that the first reason had a major effect
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on the poor performance of PHMMs. To confirm this conjecture, we have generated data
sets with position information in the following section.

5.4. Generate Data Sets with Position Information
In order to stimulate user command sequences with session beginning and ending
information, we have designed and implemented a user command sequence generator.
For each user in Schonlau data set, we use a Markov chain to generate a training
command sequence and “normal” command blocks in test data.
Firstly, to build such a Markov chain, we construct an initial state distribution
matrix, denoted by π , and a state transition probability matrix, denoted by A. To
calculate matrix π , we first count the number of distinct commands in the user training
command sequence. Let n denote this number. Then we create an array sized n to store
the frequencies of these commands. For matrix A, we create an n*n matrix to represent
all possible transitions amongst the n distinct commands.
Secondly, we generate a “real-looking” user command sequence based on π and
A. π is used to generate the first command, and A is used to generate the following
commands. In our implementation, we sort the matrix π in the order of command
frequencies. Only the first m most frequently used commands are selected as the
candidates of the first command, where m is a configurable parameter of the command
generator.
Finally, we randomly generate masquerade command sequence blocks. We have
taken a block-based algorithm used by Schonlau, which randomly selects a block from
Schonlau data set for the other users [8].
48

5.5. Detection Results of HMM vs. PHMM on Generated Data Sets
Recall that Schonlau training data consist of 5,000 commands and that the test
data consist of 10,000 commands divided into 100 blocks. We have generated the same
sized training data and test data. Then we use this whole generated set to construct a
HMM and a PHMM. As shown in Figure 24:, the detection results of HMM (the black
line) and PHMM (the light blue line) on our generated data set yields much better
performance than those of the HMM on Schonlau data set (the red line). We can exclude
the effect of masqueraded data, since we have generated the masqueraded data in the
same way as Schonlau has. But we generate the training data using a Markov chain.
Naturally, our training data is a better source for the HMM and the PHMM than Schonlau
training data. In addition, since we have only selected the most frequently used
commands as the candidates for the first command, our generated training data contains
stronger characteristics than Schonlau does.

HMM on Schonlau data set with
5,000 training commands

HMM on generated data set with
5,000 training commands

PHMM on generated data set with
5,000 training commands
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Figure 24: The detection results of the HMM and the PHMM on our generated data
vs. Schonlau data set
However, the HMM still slightly outperforms the PHMM on our data set. We
conjectured that our training data well represented user behavior patterns and thus the
position information did not provide a significant advantage for a PHMM. To verify this
conjecture, we have reduced our training data to boost the importance of the position
information. Figure 25: shows the detection results of HMM and PHMM when the
training data sets are reduced from 5,000 commands to 400 and 200 commands. Under
such circumstances, the PHMMs significantly outperform the corresponding HMMs. In
particular, the less the training data available, the better the PHMM performs than the
HMM. As shown in Figure 25, the performance gain of the PHMM with 200 training
commands over the corresponding HMM is significantly higher than the gain of the
PHMM with 400 commands. This is because the position information plays a significant
role in a PHMM when the training data does not sufficiently characterize user behavior.

HMM, 200 training cmds
HMM, 400 training cmds
HMM, 800 training cmds
PHMM, 800 training cmds
PHMM, 400 training cmds
PHMM, 200 training cmds
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Figure 25: The detection results of the HMMs and the PHMMs on our generated
data set with reduced training data

5.5.1. Conclusions

We have implemented the PHMMs for masquerade detection. We have
established the substitution matrix and the penalty function, and created pairwise
alignments using dynamic programming algorithm. We have also constructed an MSA
from the training data, and built PHMMs using the generated MSA. Then, we have used
established PHMMs to score the test data.
We have compared the detection results of the PHMMs with those of the HMMs
and the uniqueness weighted N-Gram models using Schonlau data set. We have found
that the PHMMs does not yield better performance than the HMMs since Schonlau data
set lack position information required for the PHMMs.
To overcome the limitation of Schonlau data set, we have designed and
implemented a user command sequence generator using a Markov chain. The newly
generated data characterize user behavior well and thus the position information does not
boost the performance of the PHMMs. Therefore, we have reduced the training data size
to magnify the importance of the position information. We conclude that when there is no
sufficient training data, the PHMMs significantly outperform the corresponding HMMs
since the position information complements the insufficient training data.
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6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this project, we have studied several models for masquerade detection. We
have implemented the N-Gram models using N-Gram frequency statistics. We have also
added weights of global statistics, such as command usage percentage and uniqueness,
into the N-Gram model. After comparing the detection results of un-weighted N-Gram
model with the weighted models, we have concluded that adding the global statistics into
the model yields a positive affect.
We have also implemented the HMMs for masquerade detection, and have
conducted the sensitivity analysis on the number of states in the HMMs. The
experimental results show that the impact of the number of states is minor.
Finally, we have designed and implemented the PHMMs, a novel approach for
masquerade detection. We have compared the detection results of the PHMMs with those
of the HMMs and the uniqueness weighted N-Gram models. The experimental results
show that the PHMMs do not perform as well as the HMMs on Schonlau data set. We
have analyzed the reasons and conjectured that it was primarily caused by the lack of the
session starting and ending information required by the PHMMs.
To overcome the limitation of Schonlau data set, we have generated a data set
with the session starting and ending information. We have found that since our generated
data well represents user behavior, adding session starting information does not provide a
performance boost for the PHMMs. However, when we reduce the training data size, the
additional position information is significantly helpful and thus the PHMMs yields much
better detection results than the corresponding HMMs.
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At present we have not studied the updated algorithms on Schonlau data set. In
other words, once the HMMs or PHMMs are constructed using the training data, these
models are not updated per users’ new behaviors. Other studies on the same data set have
yielded better detection results by dynamically updating user profiles [3]. Therefore,
future research can be conducted to study how much performance gain can be obtained
by exploring the updated algorithms.
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